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Browning, Robert M., Jr. Lincoln's Trident: The West Gulf Blockading
Squadron during the Civil Ward. University of Alabama Press, $69.95 ISBN
9780817318468
Prosecuting the Union Naval Blockade
This book is the third installment of Robert Browning Jr.’s exhaustive
history of the Union Navy’s Civil War blockade of the South, previous volumes
having surveyed the activities of the North Atlantic (1993) and South Atlantic
(2002) Blockading Squadrons. Although Browning was the Coast Guard’s
official historian for the past three decades (he retired in 2015), the blockade has
been the chief focus of his scholarly life’s work: certainly he knows more about
the subject than anyone else now alive, and probably more than anyone in the
past, save perhaps Edward K. Rawson, and Charles W. Stewart, who between
them were responsible for compiling and editing the Official Records of the
Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion (ORN) volumes
pertaining to the blockade.
Although both of the Atlantic Blockading Squadrons undertook major
coastal assaults—Fort Fisher by the North Atlantic Squadron and Port Royal and
Charleston by the South Atlantic Squadron—the West Gulf Squadron’s service
history was by a considerable margin the most eventful of the four squadrons,
encompassing not only the assault on the forts guarding New Orleans and the
Battle of Mobile Bay, but also prolonged and extensive operations on the
Mississippi River in 1862-63. During the course of the latter the squadron’s
activities extended as far upriver as Vicksburg, Mississippi, some 350 miles
north of New Orleans.
As has been the case with Browning’s previous volumes, the greatest value 
of Lincoln’s Trident rests less in his account of the squadron’s best-known 
undertakings—the assault on Forts St. Philip and Jackson (April 1862), running 
the gauntlet at Vicksburg (July 1863) and Port Hudson (March 1863), and the
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Battle of Mobile Bay (August 1864)—which have been recounted numerous
times by other authors, but in the more mundane, but no less significant activities
bound up in attempting to blockade more than 1,000 miles of the Gulf of
Mexico’s coastline from St. Andrews Bay, Florida to the Mexican border at the
mouth of the Rio Grande River.
Moreover, while the blockade of the mouths of the Mississippi prior to New
Orleans’ fall, that of Mobile Bay until August 1864, and of Galveston, Texas
have hitherto attracted the lion’s share of historical attention, Browning’s survey
makes clear that the squadron’s blockade was not confined to the major ports in
the western Gulf of Mexico. Indeed, many of its activities focused on passes or
inlets giving access to the interior via lakes, rivers, or sounds: Grant’s Pass, east
of the entrance to Mobile Bay, the mouth of the Atchafalaya River and Calcasieu
Pass on the Louisiana coast, Sabine Pass on the Louisiana-Texas border, and San
Luis Pass, Pass Cavallo, and Corpus Christi Pass on the Texas Coast.
Nor was blockading the sole, or even the principal undertaking of the
vessels assigned to guard these outlets to the sea: in many cases Confederate
naval forces were based in and operated from the interior, as was the case on
Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds in North Carolina Sounds—as detailed in From
Cape Charles to Cape Fear, Browning’s study of the North Atlantic Blockading
Squadron—and Union efforts centered on eliminating these threats. As a
consequence, much of Browning’s narrative of the squadron’s activities in the
Atchafalaya River, the Sabine Pass, and Matagorda Bay is devoted to small-scale
naval and amphibious operations—raids, cutting-out expeditions and the
like—rather than to blockading per se.
Another of the squadron’s responsibilities falling outside the realm of
blockading was monitoring activity at the mouth of the Rio Grande. Much of the
trans-Mississippi Confederacy’s external trade was conducted through
Matamoros, on the Mexican side of the river. The US could not legally blockade
a neutral port, nor could it even maintain a constant naval presence at the river’s
mouth, owing to inadequate logistical support, and commercial interests from
Europe—especially Great Britain—and also from New York and Boston
capitalized on the fact. The trade infuriated Northern officials, in particular
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, and led to repeated seizures of merchant
vessels on the grounds of carrying contraband of war or anchoring in US waters.
Many of these seizures, especially those of British vessels, generated diplomatic
furors between the US and foreign countries and led to protracted adjudication.
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Browning provides a succinct overview of the situation at Matamoros and its
legal and foreign-policy ramifications in the course of his larger survey.
He also deals extensively with the unglamorous but essential topic of
logistics. Maintaining a steam-powered blockading force over such an expanse
of coastline was not simply daunting: it turned out to be impossible. The main
repair facility from 1863 onward, Pensacola, was situated near the command’s
eastern limit, and was thus poorly-placed to serve as a supply base for warships
operating along the Texas coast. A major coal and provisions depot was
established at Ship Island, off the coast of Mississippi, and the capture of New
Orleans gave the navy access to its shipyards and shore-side infrastructure, but
these facilities were also too far from the western extremities of the command to
provide dependable support. David Farragut, commander-in-chief of the
squadron from January 1862 to November 1864, had therefore to rely to a large
extent on sailing vessels to patrol southwest of Galveston, with predictable
consequences for the blockade’s efficacy.
Nor does Browning neglect the human dimension. He examines the living
conditions, recreations, food and other aspects of the squadron’s seamen, as well
as the squadron’s chronic manpower shortage, a situation that led to the
large-scale recruitment of African-Americans. Likewise, he assesses the quality
of the squadron’s leadership. Farragut, not surprisingly, gets high marks for his
energy, resourcefulness, leadership, strategic vision, and ability to work
harmoniously with the Union Army, although not for his administrative acumen
(510-11). By contrast, David Dixon Porter comes off as a glory-hungry braggart,
back-stabbing subordinate, and chronic liar (128, 142).
On the downside, the book would have benefited from more careful editing.
A good deal of repetition could have been eliminated thereby. For instance, a 24
December 1861 encounter between the USS Hunstville and a Confederate
gunboat off Mobile is described on page 21 and again on page 39; the capture of
the blockade runner Magnolia is mentioned on pages 10, 15, and 37, and that of
the Caroline recounted on page 208 and again on page 241. Other examples
could be adduced. More attention to presentation would have made for a
smoother and easier read.
Furthermore, some of the figures should have been checked for accuracy.
Browning offers a table on page 514 detailing by year the amount of southern
cotton reaching New York from 1861 to 1865. Adding together the four yearly
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figures produces a total of 605,151 bales, but the text states the total figure to
have been 808,151 bales. Likewise, a table in the endnotes giving the numbers of
merchant vessels attempting to and successfully running the blockade year by
year contains several errors of calculation and lacks any figures for 1865
(647-48).
While Browning’s judgments are by and large sound, a few can be queried.
His verdict on the blockade’s effectiveness is an especially noteworthy case in
point. Given that more than 80 percent of the attempts to run the blockade were
successful, his remark that it leaked “like a sieve" is unexceptionable (513). Yet
the claim that the squadron’s “efforts to curtail blockade running failed" is
contradicted by his own evidence (513). 1,723 attempts to run the blockade were
made in 1861. The number dropped to 428 in both 1862 and 1863, to 108 in
1864 (647-48). While much of the decline doubtless owed to the capture of New
Orleans and, later, the seizure of Mobile Bay, the fact remains that there were
758 more attempts to run the blockade in 1861 than in 1862-64 combined. As
James McPherson, William Roberts, and others have argued, the blockade’s
effectiveness is best measured not by the number of ships that managed to run it,
but by the number that did not try, coupled with the fact that those that did
typically had limited carrying capacity. In this regard Browning’s analysis seems
wide of the mark, as does his statement that “[t]he South was able to export
almost half of its cotton crop through the blockade" (514).
A few other small criticisms can be made. Maps are essential to a work of
this sort, and while those supplied are serviceable, readers would be helped by a
general map of the entire command as well as greater detail on the sectional
maps. In regard to the latter deficiency, Berwick Bay, on the Atchafalaya River,
is repeatedly mentioned in the text—it is listed thirteen times in the index— but
is not identified on the relevant map of the Louisiana coast and interior west of
New Orleans (26). And here and there Browning could have been more careful
in his choice of words: “skylarking," for instance, is closer in meaning to
“frolicking" or “horse-playing" than it is to “roughhousing" (388).
These, however, are minor quibbles. On the whole, Lincoln’s Trident is a 
multi-faceted examination of the West Gulf Blockading Squadron’s activities, 
actors, and achievements. It may not constitute the last word on the subject, but 
is unlikely to be superseded by a more comprehensive work. Browning’s 
research ranges far beyond the documents printed in the ORN, encompassing the 
private correspondence of many participants both famous and obscure, as well as
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public records. He consulted collections housed in no fewer than forty-six
archives. The fruits of his research efforts are manifest in the 133 pages of
endnotes and twenty-eight pages of bibliography. For all but Civil War naval
specialists, this will be the only work on the squadron’s doings that one need
consult.
John Beeler is Professor of History at the University of Alabama, where he
specializes in European and Military and Naval history.
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